Also known as the Battle of Hare’s Hill, the early morning assault on March 25th was one of the last major attempts by the Army of Northern Virginia to break the siege of Petersburg. The past number of months of continuous warfare had left the Confederate army weakened - desertion, disease, shortage of supplies and food, and lack of manpower to fill the ranks. On March 6th, General John B. Gordon, commander of the Confederate 2nd Corps, was summoned to General Robert E. Lee’s headquarters, and was told by the commanding general, “there seemed to be but one thing that we could do — fight. To stand still was death.” Weeks later, after careful calculation, Gordon put into motion a pre-dawn strike for March 25th, 1865, attacking Fort Stedman, a well-constructed Union fort, from Colquitt’s Salient, a Confederate line of strong earthworks. The distance between Fort Stedman and Colquitt’s Salient was one of the closest along the siege lines of fortifications, and Gordon hoped that taking Fort Stedman would not only roll up the Federal lines, allowing for an all out assault on the main Union supply base at City Point (General Ulysses S. Grant’s headquarters were also present here), but also capture and destroy the U.S. Military Railroad and supply depot less than a mile behind the fort.

The attack would be primarily made by the three divisions of Gordon’s 2nd Corps and two brigades from General Bushrod Johnson’s Division of the 4th Corps, with four brigades from the 3rd Corps held in reserve — about 15,000 men in total. Facing these assaulting columns were the men of the Federal 9th Corps commanded by General John Parke.

At 4:15 a.m., the Battle of Fort Stedman began. In the darkness of the morning, Confederate pioneers first went forth and started cutting down and disassembling the obstructions in front of Fort Stedman placed there by the Federal soldiers. Following up closely behind was a small handpicked assault team (10 men from each regiment in General Matt Ransom’s Brigade) led by Lieutenant Joseph B. Hawkins of the 25th North Carolina Infantry, who were ordered to take Fort Stedman, but not attack it, as to not alert the Federals. Without firing a shot and carrying unloaded muskets, the fort was soon in the possession of Lieutenant Hawkins and his North Carolinians. How this was carried out is not definitively known. The North Carolinians could have acted as Southern deserters seeking shelter within Union lines or pretended to be retreating Union pickets posted in between the siege lines. Another explanation could be the North Carolinians used speed and surprise to their advantage. How Fort Stedman was captured so quickly by such a small amount of men without firing a shot may never be truly known. However, using whatever means necessary Lieutenant Hawkins and his small band of North Carolinians carried out their orders, completely surprising the Federal garrison and paving the way for the Confederate capture of the fort.

Soon afterwards, a handpicked group of sharpshooters advanced next, capturing fortified Federal batteries of artillery and widening the Confederate breakthrough. “They fired no shots,” wrote Captain John Deane, the commander of the 29th Massachusetts Infantry, “but used the butts of their muskets.” This, in turn, was quickly followed by the rest of Gordon’s men, who were poised for the attack. General Napoleon McLaughlen, the Union 9th Corps officer in charge of the Fort Stedman sector, quickly attempted to throw lines of defense together as the sounds of the attack reached his ears. In the darkness, while attempting to order what he supposed to be part of the Union picket line into the fray, McLaughlen realized he was giving orders to Confederates. Lieutenant Billy Gwyn, commanding the sharpshooters of the 31st Georgia Infantry, appeared out of the darkness and demanded his surrender. After the Georgians has quickly captured him, McLaughlen was taken to Gordon, to whom he surrendered his sword personally.

Gordon’s attack had achieved great success. Within minutes, Fort Stedman and over 1,000 feet of Union fortifications had been captured. Gordon tried to press the advantage, ordering General Clement Evans’ Division to assault southward toward Fort Haskell. One member of the 100th Pennsylvania Infantry would recount, “The boys were asleep in their bunks at the first volley, but grabbed guns and cartridge boxes, not even stopping to dress. Some were barefooted; some only with shirts and pants on….The regiment had been practically cut in two. The right took shelter in the rear in some old rifle pits, while Cos. B and G ran into Fort Haskell.” This attack, however, was halted by canister fire from three Federal artillery pieces and the Union defenders. Additional reinforcements from General George Pickett’s Division and General William “Rooney” Lee’s Cavalry Division also had not arrived on the field of battle to support Gordon’s movements. Pickett’s men arrived too late to participate in the fighting, and Lee’s cavalrymen could not find an avenue to get their mounted regiments into the Federal rear. Regardless of these setbacks, Gordon sent a message to Lee alerting him to the success of the early morning attack.

However, Gordon did not know about the developing Union counterattack. General John Parke, commanding the Federal 9th Corps acted decisively, and ordered General John F. Hartranft’s Division to take back Fort Stedman. Hartranft’s two brigades, containing primarily green and untested troops from Pennsylvania, went to work plugging holes, containing Confederate penetration, and thwarting Southern movement. Hartranft was successful, completely halting the Confederate advance just short of Meade Station, the U.S. Military Railroad supply depot, at 7:30 a.m. While at Fort Stedman, Gordon realized his attack was unraveling, and began scrambling to try to get his men back to safety.

At 7:45 a.m. Hartranft positioned his troops in a semicircle around Fort Stedman and the lines of works the Confederates had captured, and promptly ordered an assault. The retreating Confederates came under a heavy crossfire and suffered severe casualties. Confederate divisions, brigades, and regiments lost their cohesion, and soon found themselves pinned down, unable to retreat from their current positions. Some, like Colonel Henry Rutledge of the 25th North Carolina Infantry, attempted to drive off the Union attackers. With his cap on his sword, Rutledge yelled to his men, “Don’t let them take our front, Twenty-fifth, the Twenty-fifth has never had her front taken!” Within a matter of a few minutes, a great portion of officers and men of the 25th North Carolina were killed, seriously wounded, or found themselves prisoners of war. Other Confederate regiments were doing their best to withdraw to their own lines of fortifications without being shot to pieces running the gauntlet. One North Carolinian wrote, “Some laid down and was taken prisoners, but when I thought of Point Lookout [a famous Union prisoner of war camp] you better know I come out.”

Gordon’s assault, despite the promising start, had failed, and the 100th and 208th Pennsylvania Infantry regiments recaptured Fort Stedman. The four hour long action had resulted in 1,044 Union casualties (72 killed, 450 wounded, 522 missing or captured), while the Confederates lost significantly more — over 4,000 men (killed, wounded, and captured). The failure at Fort Stedman weakened the Confederate defensive lines around Petersburg and Richmond, and the men lost in the battle were irreplaceable. A little more than a week after the attack at Fort Stedman, the Union armies broke through the Confederate lines around Petersburg, putting Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia into flight.